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flDanila, ot fIDontoe Doctrine? 



BY 

JOHN CHETWOOD 
Author of " Immigration Fallacies " 



■♦^-^ 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGB 

Introduction, Importance of the Question 5 

Chapter I. — What the Monroe Doctrine Means and 

Involves 9 

" II, — Some Things the Monroe Doctrine does 

NOT Mean 16 

'• III. — Europe as a Factor at Manila .... 25 
u IV. — Vital and Growing Importance of the 

Monroe Doctrine . ~ • 35 

« v.— The Questions of Duty at Manila ... 38 
" VI. — The Opportunities at Manila 45 



PRICE 10 CENTS 



CSimM, ox dbomoc doctrine? 



BY 



JOHN CHETWOOD 

Author of "Immigration Fallacies" 




PUBLISHERS 

ROBERT LEWIS WEED COMPANY 

6^ FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 



Copyrighted, 1898, by 
Robert Lewis Weed Company 



p 



PHILIPPINE annexation, the dominant 
question of the hour, is so diametviciilly 
Jpposed to the principles embodied in the Mon- 
roe Doctrine that the people of the United 
States should make a careful study of the sub- 
ject before abandoning a Doctrine that thus far 
has been a rudder to the ship of state and a 
guarantee of good faith to the wh..le world. 
When the point of departure from this Doc- 
trine is clearly understood, the question will be 
found to involve a more momentous issue than 
has engaged the public mind since the close of 
the civil war. 



3 



I 



INTRODUCTION 

Importance of the Question 

T is universally conceded that the Philippine 
problem is The problem of the Spanish war. 
But the problem becomes comparatively simple 
if we decline annexation, and especially, if we 
decline it out of regard for the Monroe Doc- 
trine. In such case there remains to consider, 
aside from requisite measures of reform, only 
what we shall demand by way of coaling or 
naval stations, trading and tariff concessions, 
and commercial "openings" along the Chinese 
coast for relinquishing territorial claims in the 
neighborhood. 

On the other hand to remain at Manila and 
abandon the Monroe Doctrine, confronts us 
with a most serious question, serious not only 
for the United States, but for all civilized na- 
tions. Never until now have we faltered in 
allegiance to the Monroe Doctrine. It is the 
foundation, it not the corner stone, of the 
country's foie.gn policy since 1823, and we 
have always ascribed to it our tranquillity, 
security and freedom from enormous military 
5 



taxation, as well as our supremacy in the 
Western World. Less than three years ago to 
uphold this Doctrine we were facing war with 
a foe far more powerful than Spain, and at that 
tinie the public man who advocated yielding or 
risking the Monroe Doctrine for the sake of all 
Australasia, instead of, as now, oiily-ar-&«*ftU 
fraction tf& one* ofits distant islands, would 
have been consigned to the obscurity of private 
1 ' f 

Having/^beconie familiar with the origin and 
scope of the Monroe Doctrine, the writer has 
been impressed by the strangely scanty refer- 
ences to it at the present crisis. It is not to be 
expected that it would receive consideration 
from those that started the petitions for annex- 
ation, Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Tiade, 
and similar bodies who naturally look at Ma- 
nila thi-ongh coninierciiil .s})L'ct;icles, and thus 
fail to discern the weightier matters of diplo- 
macy, statesmanship and international law. 
That the annexation press should do likewise 
is also natural. 

On the other liand the attitude of the con- 
servative papers has been puzzling. Arrri June 
was well on into its second week before it was 
clearly intimated in Congress, as well as by a 
very eminent jurist, that Asiatic acquisition in- 
volved a virtual repeal of the Monroe Doctrine. 



Even up to the present lime many conservative 
people apparently unregardful of the Monroe 
Doctrine, seem satisfied with the lesser serious 
objections which they urge to annexation. 
Ncv^ttiol oss the writer maintains that the 
Monroe Doctrine while the greatest is the 
easiest to understand. Hi fact, he believes the 
vital and controlling issue to be Manila, or 
Monroe Doctrine? He further believes that 
for the American people to fully^nderstand 
the issue new-at-stalce wttt^lS^t in their re- 
cording a decisive verdict-against Manila. 

San Francisco, Cal., Sept. 15, 1898. 



CHAPTER I 

What the Monroe Doctrine Means and In- 
volves 

THE Moiiioe Doctrine is^an application to 
America of what Europe has long called 
'' the balance of power."' In effect it says to 
the nations of Europe, "since we do not meddle 
in your hemisphere, seek not to conquer or 
colonize in ours/' We run counter to its spirit 
and letter if we annex portions of the Old 
World, and at the same time control the desti- 
nies of the New. " Imperialism " could stretch 
no furtiier. 

In this connection it is worth our while to 
consider the scope and meaning of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine to the men who formulated it. 
First, it will be interesting to note that the 
feature of Monroe's policy which has caused 
most controversy, the one forbidding further 
acquisition of Auierican territory by Europe, 
originated with John Quincy Adams, Monroe's 
Secretary of State, and that the full name of 
the Monroe Doctrine should be the Monroe- 
Adams- Jefferson-Madison Doctrine. 
9 



10 

For sometime before the appearance of Presi- 
dent Monroe's message, our relations with 
Russia had been somewhat disturbed over tlie 
northwest boundary disputes, which were 
linally settled by the purchase of Alaska. At 
Washingtou on Jnly 17, 1823, Secretary of 
State John Quincy Adams, stated to Baron 
Tuyl, Russia's representative, "that we should 
assume distinctlj^ the principle that the Amer- 
ican continents are no longer subjects for any 
new European colonization establishments;" 
and this statement his son, Charles Francis 
Adams, has well called " the first hint of the 
policy afterward known as the Monroe Doc- 
trine." ' Writing on July 2, 1823, to Richard 
Rush and referring in a different connection to 
the same matter, our then minister to England, 
Mr. Adams, observes, " the American conti- 
nents henceforth will no longer be subject to 
colonization." '^ 

Mr. Adams' remark was caused by the newly 
formed coalition of tlie powers of Russia, Aus- 
tria and Prussia in what was known as the 
Holy Alliance. These powers were just then 
apprehensive of the spread of democratic ideas, 

' Charles F. Adams' Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, Vol. 6, 
page 163, and note. 

*The Mouroe Doctrine, by Geo. F. Tucker, Chap, 2, 
page 13, 



11 

and of the popular uprisings all over the world 
that seemed to menace their systems of govern- 
ment. For instance, revolutions were break- 
ing out in Spain and Portugal, and the Spanish 
colonies in America l)ad proclaimed and practi- 
cally established tlieir independence. The 
powers deputed to France the task of " restor- 
ing order " in Spain, and at the Congress of 
Verona, in 1822, tiie " Holy Alliance " seriously 
discussed bringing back to their allegiance the 
revolted colonies of Spain. 

Then, at the suggestion of Mr. Canning, 
prime minister of England, the American pres- 
ident proclaimed his celebrated Doctrine. 
Meant to prevent interference by the European 
monarchies with the republics of America or 
their institutions, it was entirely successful. In 
embodying the idea designed to bar Europe 
from further extension of territory in America, 
the president went further than England wished 
— although not further than the American peo- 
ple have seemed to ni)pi-ove in the Venezuelan 
dispute. 

Before preparing his message, Monroe con- 
sulted his predecessors in office, Madison and 
Jefferson. Mr. Madison, on October 30, 1828, 
in a letter to President Monroe refers to the 
dangers threatening, through the Holy Alliance, 
our neighbors on the south ; to our interest in. 



12 

and sympathy with their republican institu- 
tions; and to "the consequences threatened by 
;i command of their resources by the great 
powers ", — considerations which " cull for our 
efforts to defeat the meditated crusade." ' Mr. 
Jefferson was even more explicit. In leplying 
to the president, he says: " The question pre- 
sented by the letter you have sent me is the 
most momentous which has ever been offered 
to my contemplation, since that of Independ- 
ence. That made us a nation, this sets our 
compass and points the course we are to steer 
through the ocean of time opening for us. . . 
. . Our first and fundamental maxim should 
be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of 
Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe 
to intermeddle in cis-Atlantic affairs. America, 
north and south, has a set of interests distinct 
from those of Europe and peculiarly her own. 
She should therefore have a system of her own 
separate and distinct fj'om that of Europe."" 

Thus fortified by^J&S- e milil e ilors the presi- 
dent addressed to Congress the document of 
December 2, 1823. In it he refers to the nego- 
tiations pending with Russia and Great Britain 

» Letters aud Writings of James Madison, Vol. :?, page 
339, 

« Writings of Jefferson, published by order of Congress, 
Vol. 8, page 315. 



^ 



for the amicable adjustment of their interests 
to ours on the northwest boundaries of the 
continent, and adds: " In the discussion to 
which these interests have given rise, and ni 
the arrangements by which they may be ter- 
minated, the occasion has been judged proper 
for asserting as a principle in which the rights 
and interests of the United States are involved 
that the American continents by the free and 
independent condition which they have assumed 
and maintained, are henceforth not to be con- 
sidered as subjects for future colonization by 
any European power/ 

Toward the close of the message the presi- 
dent refers to the popular agitations in Spain 
and Portugal, as to agitations on which we look 
with interest and sympathy, but without any 
disposition to interfere, for he remarks: "In 
the wars of the European powers, in matters 
relating to themselves, we have never taken 
any part, nor does it comport with our interest 
to do so." But—" with the movements in this 
hemisphere, we are of necessity more immedi- 
ately connected. ... We owe it there- 
fore to candor and to the amicable relations 
existing between the United States and these 
powers, to declare that we should consider any 
attempt on their part to extend their system to 
any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to 



14 

our peace and safety. With the existing col- 
onies or dependencies of any P^uropean power 
we have not interfered and shall not interfere/" 
And as to the American states which had de- 
clared their independence and been recognized 
by us, "we could not view any interposition 
for the purpose of oppressing them for controll- 
ing their destiny by any European power, in 
any other light than as the manifestation of 
an unfriendly disposition toward the United 
States." He afterward repeats that our policy 
has been, and is, " not to interfere in the in- 
ternal concerns of Europe," but as to this con- 
tinent it is wliolly different. European political 
systems cannot be extended " to any portion 
of either continent without endangering our 
peace and happiness." Reverting to the sub- 
ject in his message of December 7, 1824, the 
president states : " It is impossible for the 
European governments to interfere in the con- 
cerns of our neiglibors without affecting us." ^ 

There are two propositions that stand out 
distinctly from the state documents just 
quoted. One, is that the powers are no longer 
to interfere or to extend their holdings in our 
sphere, or hemisphere; the other, is that we 
disclaim the thought or intention of extend- 

' Statesman's Manual, by Edwin Williams, Vol. 1, pp. 
452-3, 46U-1 and 476. 



15 



ing our possessions in theirs. In view of 
the language of the message and of its con- 
text, it is difficult to understand why Amer- 
icans of learning and ability should dispute 
either clause of the first proposition, which 
they do when they admit that Europe is for- 
bidden to overturn any American government, 
but not that Europe is restrained from enlarg- 
ing her holdings on this continent. 

If those who dispute part of the first proposi- 
tion stopped at this point, we might in answer 
merely refer them to the foregoing quotations. 
But they go even further, and denying our 
right or need to invoke against Europe the 
principle of non-extension on this hemisphere, 
open the way to utter annihilation of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine by destroying the moral basis 
upon which it stands. For the Monroe Doc- 
trine ceases to be a Doctrine of equity and jus- 
tice if while continuing to enforce it for Amer- 
ican interest in the New World, we do not con- 
tinue to refrain from interfering with European 
interests, that is with -the balance of power," 
in the Old World. 

For instance, we enforced the Monroe Doc- 
trine in the Venezuelan aftair. A waste of 
water and jungle and mining land was in dis- 
pute ; England was pushing forward her bor- 
ders and to all appearance had greatly en- 



16 

larged them. The intrinsic value of the soil may 
have been iiltle, perhaps mucii less than was 
claimed. But the principle involved was very 
important. Under the guise of boundary con- 
tests the foreign powers can extend their pos- 
sessions on this continent^ almost indefinitely, 
and without effectual resistance, unless from us. 
The appetite for land, once acquired, is hard to 
satisfy, as we ourselves begin to realize. It 
has to be checked at once, and this country 
with a true instinct, ranged itself naturally and 
rightfully beside the president in the Venezuela 
difference. 

The second prominent point in Monroe's 
message, disavowing any intent to interfere in 
European affairs is so important as to belong to 
a new chapter. 



CHAPTER TI 



Some Things the Monroe Doctrine does net 
Mean 

IN saying " we liave never taken part in mat- 
ters relating to the European powers," and 
"our policy is not to interfere with their con- 
cerns," President Monroe embodied the thought 
if not the words of Thomas Jefferson, " our first 



17 

and fundamental inaxiin should be never to 
entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe." 
This is quite plainly the meaning of President 
Monroe's message, and applies directly to the 
situation of affairs in the late Spanish war. 

Had we carried that war into Europe or 
Northern Africa, as was more than once pro- 
posed, should we have been allowed a free hand 
there? We might have destroyed Spanish 
ships, and blockaded or bombarded Spanish 
ports, but it is certain the powers would have 
prevented any annexation of Spanish territory. 
Such an annexation would have given the 
United States fortified outposts on the soil of 
Europe which, in event of war with any foreign 
nation could be used as a base of attack. 

Since the time of Monroe, in fact from the 
days of Washington, we have resisted every in- 
ducement or temptation to assume the conquer- 
ing, menacing, undemocratic attitude involved 
in such a plan of campaign, though it has been 
gravely and frequently urged by the more vio- 
lent organs of annexation. 

Any attempt of the United States to grasp 
European soil would at once upset the delicate 
equilibrium of that continent, and be resented 
as insufferable aggression, -arftd would resemble 
an effort by Germany or Russia to appropriate 
the Island of Cuba. In the late war if either 



18 



of these nations had been opposed to Spain, she 
might have destroyed Spanish shipping and 
blockaded Cuban ports or seized and occupied 
them temporarily. But any attempt to annex 
the island and substitute for decadent Spain a 
strong military power at our very doors would 
have aroused in us the instincts of self-protec- 
tion. We would have reminded the victorious 
power, or invoked the Monroe Doctrine to re- 
mind her, that we had always confined our 
operations to our own hemisphere and had an- 
nounced to the great po\yers of the other hem- 
isphere that they must follow our example. 
Hitherto they have fyllowed our example with 
some reluctance, 4«4 if we invade their he niis- 
phere on the coast of Asia twwe \Ve^ any i^'gb^ ^^^^^ 
te--«^ppese-JJia4-4h^^^-wiH--«©«4i«t*^^^ 7^; 

ik^^ltdiwJ^-JflJiart-Ave4»ftv«--eommi tted o i tya elv es ^ 
a4Hl--w4H«4i--w«-Avi4]r4>€U4j^iUi44^^ 

Of course at Manila we do- not menace the 
stability of the powers as directly as we should 
at Ceuta or Cadiz ; still, it must bo remembered 
that Europe and Asia are not only in the same 
hemisphere but are virtually one continent. 
Even in the early days of the century Europe 
had projected itself at more than one point into 
Asia. Now with Russia ruling all the North, 
England mistress of a greatly widened India, 
France and Germany, England, Holland and 



19 



Spain holding vast provinces or islands along 
the eastern or southeastern coasts, the vast 
continent of Asia has practically become the 
annex of Europe. 

At the Philippines we are in a nest of Euro- 
pean or Japanese dependencies, with England 
and Holland to the south, France on the main- 
land opposite, Germany and England on the 
northwest, and the countries of Russia and 
Japan beyond. Such are the commercial, 
strategic and political advantages of the group 
that their transfer to any one of the rival 
powers, or their absorption by a strong new 
power will unquestionably disturb the equilib- 
rium of Europeanized Asia. While neither 
Germany, Holland, France nor Russia would 
be affected by our annexing the Philippines as 
directly as they would be affected by our in- 
vasion of Spain or Morocco, why should we 
expect them to limit their objections to us as a 
neighbor in Europe only ? We do not restrict 
the operation of the Monroe Doctrine to the 
near-by regions of Cuba or Venezuela ; but ex- 
tend it all the way to Cape Horn. And the 
latter is practically as remote from our territory 
on the Gulf of Mexico as Cochin-China is from 
Paris, or Kao-Chang from Berlin. Moreover 
we own no territory near Cape Horn to which 
French, German or Italian colonies would be 



20 

near neigbbors, while we shall become a neigh- 
bor to colonies of these powefs by remaining at 
Manila. 

It hardly seems needful to argue further the 
inconsistency of trying to retain both Manila 
and the Monroe Doctrine, and it is becoming a 
matter of no small interest to ask what Europe 
will have to say on the subject. One of the 
powers, however, holds that we have already 
violated the Doctrine by taking Porto Rico and 
Hawaii. This assertion we cannot afford to ig- 
nore. For if we have already broken our tra- 
ditional policy, and if that policy was the only 
thing that stood between us and Manila, we 
might as well take up our march to empire. 
Indeed if we have surrendered, or intend to sur- 
render, our control of the American continents, 
looking at the matter from a commercial stand- 
point, in return we ought not to be satisfied 
with anything less than a continent, and we 
ought to set about securing it at once. When 
it is understood that the Monroe Doctrine is 
dead, and that the West Indies and South and 
Central America are open to the powers, as a 
beginning we should immediately join in and se- 
cure our slice of China. 

However, the part of the message quoted 
shows that, so far, we have not broken the Doc- 
trine in the smallest degree. That Doctrine for- 



21 

bids Europe to conquer or annex in this heffl- 
/.sphere for fear of disturbing its, and our equi- 
librium, and it inferentially pledges this coun- 
try to respect the equilibrium of the other hem- 
isphere, ^^u rope could not be injured by any 
expansion of ours over here unless we annexed, 
her territory, and she would not be endangered 
by that. In encroaching on any of our neigh- 
bors we would have to reckon with them alone, 
though of course, in acting unjustly we should 
receive and deserve the reproach of mankind. 

From England came the suggestion that we 
have already broken the Monroe Doctrine. 
Though our recently improved relations with 
that power are one of the good results of the 
war, it must be carefully noted at this juncture 
that nothing would please Great Britain more 
than to have us as a neighbor in the far East. 
She stands there struggling to hold her own 
against Russia and France, if not Germany also, 
and without a single friend, unless it be Japan. 
Naturally she would welcome another friend, 
and be glad to form an "alliance." And it must 
be confessed that if we hold territory there we 
must expect rivals and enemies, and would 
therefore need friends ourselves. The "en- 
tangling alliance" so deprecated . bv Washing- 
ton, may prove a necessity. It would be only a 
question of time. 



The English themselves, to do them justice, 
are perfectly frank in this matter. The Specta- 
tor of July 16, 1898, dwells on the continental 
dislike of America, founded, like its hatred of 
England, on .the progress and comparative pros- 
perity of the two Anglo-Saxon powers. Europe 
classes the two together, says The Spectator^ and 
puts them in the same boat, — where, the infer- 
ence is, they naturally belong. 

The Saturday Review of the same date asks : 
''Now how will the advent of the new power 
affect the Eastern equilibrium ? " The question 
is answered thus: "From the selfish Biitish 
point of view we hope that the Americans will 
take both the Canaries and the Philippines, — 
and if they wished a port on the coast of China 
l)esides, they should have our help in getting it. 
The weary Titan that Matthew Arnold spoke 
of, with every muscle strained by the weight of 
empire, challenged on this side and on that by 
new competitors, menaced now and then by a 
combination of envious enemies, suddenly now 
finds standing at his side a stalwart son, who, 
though he has his own place in the world, and 
his own ambitions, yet seems inclined to say 
that the old Titan shall always have at least a 
fair field, and if the worse comes to the worst, 
some little favor. And that is the way we 
British feel about America." 



23 

This is instructive as well as interesting. 
Equally interesting, perhaps, if not quite so in- 
structive, will be a quotation from a letter in 
the New York Tribune of August 2, 1898, from 
its London correspondent on '' Misconceptions 
About Monroeism." "English writers," says 
the correspondent, "assume that the Monroe 
Doctrine has been abandoned in the present 
conflict with Spain. An expression I constantly 
hear in conversation and read in print is ' Mon- 
roeism is dead.' The misconception arises from 
confounding the Washington Farewell Address 
with the complement of it in the ISIonroe Doc- 
trine. The Washington principle was that 
Americans must remain out of European alli- 
ances and entanglements." The Monroe prin- 
ciple was that Europeans must keep their hands 
off the American continent, retaining such pos- 
sessions as they already held but not enlarging 
their colonial holdings and conquests. 

The United States in waging war with Spain 
f.,r the deliverance of Cuba and Porto Rico 
from Spanish rule only rect.gnized what the 
civilized world has acknowledged, namely : that 
Spain is no longer able to care for her colonial 
possessions. But the essential principle of Mon- 
roeism that European jiowers are not to enlarge 
their domain in the Western Hemisphere has 
not been renounced or compromised. Monroe- 



24 

ism is vitalized by tlie enlargement of Ameri- 
can influence in the West Indies." The writer 
in tlie New York Tribune adds: "that if the 
powers were to assume tlie death of Monroe- 
ism they would speedily be convinced of its 
vitality," and then continues, "The invasion 
and occupation of the Philippines imply renun- 
ciation of tlie Washington doctrine of non-in- 
tervention in European affairs. This is what 
English wiiters have really in mind when they 
speak of repudiation of Monroeism two years 
after the Venezuela question was raised in an 
aggressive form. If the Americans proclaim a 
protectorate in that quarter they will enter 
upon a career of expansion which may menace 
European interests and draw them into entan- 
glements with foreisrn Powers. The Monroe 
Doctrine will not be affected by the settlement 
of the Philippine question. The Washington 
Doctrine is at stake in the South Seas and may 
be fatally compromised if the Philippines are 
retained as a permanent American depend- 
ency." 

We may entirely agree with the writer just 
quoted that the Monroe Doctrine is in no way 
impaired but " vitalized " by any of our acquisi- 
tions in this Hemisphere. But we must part 
company with him in one or two places where 
we have ventured to introduce italics. The 



25 

Wushington Farewell Address Doctrine is 
called the ''complement" of the Monroe Doc- 
trine. But as the theory of our non-interven- 
tion in European entanglements runs through 
both, the address should be called not merely 
the " complement" but the foundation of the 
Monroe Doctrine. They are virtually the same 
thing where the annexation of Asia is con- 
cerned. The correspondent is therefore as cor- 
rect in saying that the Washington Doctrine 
will be fatally compromised by retaining Manila 
as he is incorrect in holding that the Monroe 
Doctrine will not be. 

It will also be noted that the correspondent 
is one of the very large and apparently grow- 
ing number of people who would stoutly up- 
hold the Monroe Doctrine in this Hemisphere 
but would refuse Europe a right to uphold a 
similar doctrine at Manila. Let us see how 
Europe is likely to regard so one-sided a 
theory. 



CHAPTER HI 
Europe as a Factor at Manila 

IT was right to insist tliat tlie powers siiould 
observe all the rules of neutrality and the 
usages of warfare while we were engaged witli 



26 

Spain on the coast of Asia. Onr national dig- 
nity and self-res})ect demanded that our cam- 
paign there should not be hampered in any 
wa}'. Asa war measure we had every right to 
bombard or capture Manila or any or the whole 
of the Philippine Archipelago. We had, and 
have the right to retain possession of the group 
in whole, or in part, pending the conclusion of 
a treaty of peace and perhaps to remain in pos- 
session for a reasonable period afterward, either 
to enforce some conditions of the treaty of 
peace or to restore law and order. 

Possession, however, being nine points in law, 
is nine and a half points in war, and the powers 
may be expected before very long to inquire 
our nltimate intentions. If the reasoning of the 
preceding chapters is sound, we may exi)ect 
that they will not only ask our intentions, but 
perhaps make manifest their own. To preserve 
" the balance of power,'' they may insist upon 
a " Moniir Doctrine of tlie East " as an offset 
to our "Monroe Doctrine of the West." 

There are indications tliat they are already 
preparing to do so. Press dispatches of July 
15, 1898, contained this item sent from Paris 
July 14, and apparently "inspired": "The 
Matin lias received from its London corre- 
spondent, who has unusual sources of informa- 
tion, a dispatch in which he says the Chancel- 



2^ ■ 

lories of the powers are now discussing the 
question of the eventual intervention of powers 
in the Philippines. Germany would prefer 
maintenance of the status quo, but if, as a con- 
sequence of the war, Spanish sovereignty disap- 
pears Ameiican sovereignty must not be its 
successor. An international agreement will be 
established, and the powers interested will each 
be called on to protect its own interests. This 
is the logical outcome of the 3Ionroe iJocfrine, the 
principle of which will be employed by Europe to 
protect itself against American interference.'^ 

We emphasize the last few lines of the quo- 
tation because although they appeared in the 
associated press dispatches of tlie American 
papers, many of the latter have industriously 
avoided notice of the dispatch in their editorial 
columns. When they have brought themselves 
to discuss the Philippine problem with any re- 
gard to the Monroe Doctrine at all, it has been 
their usual custom briefly to assert : 

1. That the Monroe Doctrine does not ap- 
ply — which is wholly untenable; 

2. That it is obsolete, as we are now too 
strong to be injured by any conquest of South 
or CJentral America — which may possibly find 
favor abroad, but is unlikely to find favor at 
home, or even in England so soon after the 
Venezuela affair ; 



28 

3. That WE do not consider that it applies 
— which must mean that we are prepared to 
pose before the world, carrying Manila on one 
shoulder and the Monroe Doctrine on the 
other, an - entorpriso of tjfaipondouo ma ^ gnUude . 

¥e%Tlie point is not liow inconsistent ive may 
bo in regai f d te ^MTinila and the Monroe Doc- 
trine, but fta to - what other nations may think 
about tjha inconsistency. If they differ with 
us, sooner or later there will be a conflict 
which will cost us no matter how it ends, the 
full value of the Philippines many times multi- 
plied. 

If we can only bring ourselves to look at the 
situation from a European standpoint we shall 
see that the prospect of such a conflict is by no 
means remote. In the June number of Har- 
per s Monthhi, " Cathay " writes : " It is a 
favorite commonplace to say that the world is 
growing very small, but, few people, perhaps, 
realize the deadly earnest which underlies that 
commonplace. For it is within the limits of 
this small world of ours that the nations of the 
earth must live and move and have their being; 
and in the same proportion as with the growing 
requirements of modern civilization each nation 
needs more elbow room for itself, the area within 
which it can hope to find that elbow room is 
being daily and steadil}- exhausted. The popu- 



&9 

lation of the civilized portions of the earth has 
increased by leaps and bounds— that of the 
British Isles for instance, from sixteen to forty 
millions daring the course of the present cen- 
tury, that of the states which now form the 
German Empire from twenty-four to fifty mil- 
lions, that of the United States from six to 
seventy millions— the average duration of life 
has increased, and the progress of science and 
the more humane tendency of legislation com- 
bine to preserve many lives which from the 
purely economic point of view are rather a bur- 
den than a benefit to the community. At the 
same time the living wage, the standard of lux- 
ury, the proportion of unproductive to produc- 
tive expenditure, have risen no less rapidly m 
every class of society. 

" To satisfy these growing needs every civi- 
lized nation has been driven to work at a pres- 
sure unknown to former generations. Indus- 
trial activity and commercial enterprise have 
assumed gigantic developments. The marvel- 
ous discoveries of science have enabled the civ- 
ilized world to multiply and intensify its pow- 
ers of production to an almost unlimited ex- 
tent. But to produce is one thing, and to dis- 
l)Ose of what is produced is another. The 
powers of production of the civilized world have 
outstripped its powers of consumption, and 



30 

congestion is only averted by tiie continuous 
opening up of new markets and new fields of 
enterprise in those portions of the earth where 
the resources of nature and the energies of man 
still lie dormant. Industry, in the widest sense 
of the term, is, to-day. the breath of the social 
organism throughout the civilized world, and 
the cry for more trade — more markets — is as 
imperative as the cry of the human organism 
for more air when threatened with suffocation."' 

This admirable summary of tlie situation 
puts in quite a different light what we have 
been prone to call the "earth hunger'' of our 
less favored European rivals. Their methods 
of opening new channels of trade or outlets to 
surplus population have no doubt often de- 
served criticism. Some allowance should be 
made for the peculiar conditions and obstacles 
with which the Old World is obliged to struggle. 
There is no standing still ; the great powers 
must necessarily expand or retrograde. S[)ain hei-seZ 
strikingly illustrates this assertion ; up to 1192 
sh»- wao expandi n g, cinc o- th o n & he- has been rctro - 
g radii - >g . The efforts of the powers to open and 
develop new markets, new colonies, are really 
efforts to avert decay and eventual destruction. 
And on the success of such efforts rests their 
fitness to survive. 

To complete the thought we turn again to 



31 



"Cathay": "In this tremendous competition 
the Anglo-Saxon race has, by a singular combi- 
nation of energy and foresight and good for- 
tune, secured a splendid start. Great Britain 
has built up for herself a world-wide colonial 
empire; the United States, stretching from 
ocean to ocean across one of the most favored 
regions of the earth, overshadows a whole con- 
tinent. It is not, after all, unnatural that 
other nations, having lagged behind in the race, 
should resent the start we have obtained, and 
that when the moment seems to have arrived 
for finally opening up the greatest and richest 
field " (referring to China but these words apply 
both to China and South America) "which tlie 
world still holds in reserve, they should be in- 
clined to cry to us: 'hands off! You have al- 
ready more than your fair share. It is our turn 
now to help ourselves, and to redress the 
balance in our favor.' The growing jealousy 
with which both branches of the Anglo-Saxon 
race are regarded by the leading powers of the 
European continent is, at any rate, a fact which 
has to be reckoned witli. . . . 

" France, thoroughly awakened at last to the 
value of the colonial empire she once threw 
away, has devoted no small part of her energies 
throughout this century, and especially during 
its last decades, to repairing her blunders of 



32 

the last century. Germany, whose rajjid trans- 
furniation from an agricultural to an industrial 
state of the first rank has been a far more 
momentous event than her political reconstruc- 
tion, is pressing on in the same course with the 
feverish haste of a belated traveler. Slowly 
but steadily, with the resistless momentum of 
its massive power, the mysterious empire of the 
Tsar moulds its policy of territorial expansion 
to new shapes under the influence of its silent 
development. And moving thus on parallel 
lines, they combine to curse the 'selfishness' of 
the Anglo-Saxon race, which bars their progress 
by the indefeasible right of prior occupancy." 

Let us put this argument to the proof upon 
the map of the Globe. Study of it will show 
that less favored nations have reasons, to fear 
and to envy the Anglo-Saxon. Great Britain 
has in her colonial system embraced all the best 
temperate regions outside of Europe and Amer- 
ica, and has millions of hardy subjects on the 
latter continent. Almost everywhere , ill the 
Old World the other powers see the earth pre- 
empted or preoccupied by England. Turning 
their gaze this way, they again behold Great 
Britain ruling to the north, and the other great 
Anglo-Saxon nation in possession of the best 
and largest portion of North America. 

More than that, we actually " overshadow " 



33 



the continent, as "Cathay" has said. Euro, 
pean powers though covetous of the vast and 
fertile regions embraced in South America, 
acknowledge our dominance and therefore re- 
spect our dictum that no European power sliall 
acquire a foothold in the Americas. 

In the eyes of Europe our nation has already 
assumed a selfish and domineering attitude. 
When Germany thought of buying Cuba in 
1885, and broached the subject to th^govern^^ 
ment at Washington, she was informed^Hmt tlie 
cloak of the Monroe Doctrine covered both 
continents, from the North Pole to Cape Horn. 
Bismarck then said, " the Monroe Doctrine is 
a doctrine of insolence." While complement- 
ing our other doctrine^wtiicti respects " the bal- 
ance of power" in the OJd Wodd^, Uie ^on/oe^;^^ 
Doctrine is not insolent.^ But it would be in- 
solent wore we to claim the right to J' balance 
of power" in the W««few( Hcmuvf)W e, and i^h^n 
-^Vchangfe our shield for a sword, wore to^ mter- 
feraAfith " the balance of power " in the Ew*«- 

petvft world. 

\/]iatever the European powers may have to 
say on this subject, let us hope will be said be- 
fore very long— before we have finally cora- 
miited ourselves to the annexation of Manila. 
So far as the writer of this pamphlet knows, 
from July 14, 1898, when the article quoted 



34 

from on page 26 appeared in the Matin, little 
has been lieard of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia. ''^ 
Perhaps there is no special significance in this 
silence. Bnt then again it may mean that the 
powers are^ unaule to form a satisfactory league 
among themselves, or that they have already 
done so, and that what they really desire and 
are waiting for, is to see ns take a very small 
slice of Asia, and in this act surrender the con- 
trol of America. In either case is it not well 
for us to move with exceeding great care at this 
crisis in the histoiy of two hemispheres ? «Are , 
w^-^i^kJa^ce--to-^aee- with t y hc - quciTtioH , shall we 
suffer the Monroe Doctrine to continue a living 
Doctrine, or shall we do it to death with our 
own hands ? 

" If we allowed it to be known that we should 
not object to the colonization of South Amer- 
ica by the powers of Europe it would not be 
five years before the whole continent was di- 
vided.*" This quotation is from a recent edi- 
torial in a leading journal of the Pacific Coast, 
a staungh upholder of the Monroe Doctrine. 
¥4W— a^-^)f course, this patriotic journal ad- 
vocates nothing that would jeopardize the Doc- 
trines?"*^ On the contrar3% A\4th- ft ynicidal short - 
s ightcdncDDy feht^ s» me journal is for annexation, 
— and for extending its circulation a mong the 
devoted Filipinos. I 




t^^--f*y ^ {fr-rC'^ 






CHAPTER IV 

Vital and Growing Importance of the Monroe 
Doctrine 

SO^FE of the very jjapers that urge Asiatic 
annexation are becoming alive to the 
greatly increased importance which the war has 
given to the precepts of Monroe. The enter- 
prising journal quoted at the end of the last 
chapter very sagely said on the 25th of August, 
1898: "The outlook of the country has ex- 
panded in the Spanish-American war. . . • 
The battle for the trade of China is to be 
fought, peacefully we hope, but possibly, with 
guns and ships and soldiers. . . • The pow- 
ers of Europe have in the last fifteen years gone 
into, colonization with vigor. Africa and Asia 
occupied their energies for the time, but when 
the fate of China is settled these continents 
will have been divided. 

"South America remains, a vast area thinly 
populated, with soil of great fertility. • ■ • 
For the future the freedom of these lands de- 
pends on the ability and disposition of the 
United States to fight for them. There is 
no doubt of the disposition of the United 
35 



36 

States. Our people are practically a unit 
for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, 
and are ready to resent in arras the at- 
tempt of any European power to occupy any 
part of the American continents. But . . 
. it is not impossible that there will be a 
combination of Europe to smash our policy." 
Precisely so. And if we changed our disliked 
policy from a defensive to an offensive one the 
possibility is pretty sure to become a certainty. 
And a deplorable certainty. For the impulse 
wliich the war has given the Monroe Doctrine 
is obvious. With the acquisition of Porto Rico 
and Hawaii, to say nothing of Cuba, control of 
the Nicaragua Canal becomes a necessity. In 
that our interest is paramount. England on 
guard at Suez, claims that the canal there links 
the mother-country to her colonies. The Nic- 
aragua. Canal will do even more for us. 44y-it 
^ouY east and west coasts will be brought to- 
getlier, a nd - our cj^ot e iii of defoncc will bo uKidc 
almo i r fe' iiivinoibtc. — It i3 to be our Gjbi'altar 
In time of war it sliould be open to our navy 
and closed to the navies of our enemies. Dis- 
pute over our control of this waterway by any 
European power would be most repugnant to 
the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, far more re- 
pugnant than any foreign aggression or exten- 
sion in lliis Hemisphere could have been i)efore 



37 

we shall have become possessed of so vulnerable 
a point of attack. 

As it is, we are even now more open 
not merely to attack but to invasion than 
we have ever been before. From such 
ports and stations as Europe owns in South 
America or the West Indies, fleets could harry 
•mw our coasts or bombard them. H-trwrevoii , ttt 
thiu pi'crjcnt timc, ^ny invading force would 
speedily be confronted with five or tenfold its 
number of Anglo-Saxojas, and would advance 
to its own destruction. Suppose, in the future, 
twenty-five or fifty thousand Germans or 
Frenchmen were to hold command of the sea 
long enough to effect a landing in Cuba or 
Porto Rico, how difficult and dangerous an un- 
dertaking it would be for us first to regain con- 
trol of the sea, then to transporttliou sands of 
troops, s4atio«--^^«ia a^K^ m«4W»ttv*t4lt#4«--so-as- 
to dislodge the entrenched invaders. At such 
a perfectly supposable crisis, if we should be 
unlucky enough to own the Philippines, which 
are 7,000 miles away from us, and only a few 
hundred miles distant from strong and heavily 
garrisoned French and German colonies, what, 
may I aok, would be the advantage of having 

oii««e«- Manila ? ^^rk^ ^ 15/37^77^ 

O j i06-^-&cmat¥uotftiL the Nicaragua Canal^^-wttt 
e- xiotcncc, and in the eyes 



38 

tof-t»ll-^4t*ti^tte^ the neighboring lands and seas 
will acquire new value and strategic importance. 
Then more than one pow er will covet ownership 
of West Indian islands. For example, Den- 
mark is willing to sell St. Thomas, w hich would 
be a great prize for Germany. Even now, there 

-are indications that guardianshij) of the Nica- 
ragua Canal, and preservation of the integrity 
of the VV^estern Hemisphere-may eventually tax 
our national strength and resources to their 
fullest extent without the further burden of 

ivianna. _^^ j^^^ ^>,^ ^ j)^^ ^ ^/7r<;, i t cW ^l t'rft^^c ze7t ^ 

Doctrine has beep-<Tf^^/^^^i,^/j, 
our natjpfi^TpeacQ/^^ ?«/?" (/ 
1 tl^e Mrreshold of the 
e we prepared to 



abandon a T>siGtn\\Q of such"^u4^xissing value 
that itsjndlkers, and even we, ourselV^^cannot 
meastire its precious significance to millioiTs-yet^ 
UfiDorn ? 




CHAPTER V 



The Questions of Duty at Manila 

IN the realm of nature and of law, and of con- 
science, the higher duty always governs, i^A* /^n/^r- 
When higher and lesser duties present their 
claims, and the conflict between them cannot 



39 



be adjusted, the higher duties take precedence 

and the lesser are not to be discharged. Cei i ^,'77^^ ^' 

What are our higher duties at Manila ?^In 
point of time, those we took there with us,^ie 
ones discussed in the preceding chapters, the 
ones we hti¥» assumed to our own race, to our 
own hemisphere, and to the powers of the East- 
ern World, when we planted our feet in the 
paths marked out by Wf«hiH-gt«Li^i«Jiis4a*€- 

Madison »H-4he-^krtm»e Doctri iM ^ . These^udes ^ 
are and should ever be paramount. No^wiser^ 
or finer counsel for Americans at tliis.time can 
be found than the warning, ewiiobuialivr fines 
of James Russell Lowell: 

"O, my friends thauk your God, if you have one, that He 
'Twixt the Old World and yon set ihe gulf of n sea. 
Be strong-handed, brown-hacked, upright as your pines, 
By the scale of a finnisphcrc shape your designs." 

As to the various minor obligations imposed 
on us or assumed by us at Manila, some of them 
are imaginary ; while otliers may be discharged 
without annexing Asiatic soil and thus without 
conflicting with our higher duties. Any prom- 
ises to the insurgents based on theoretical 
assumptions of annexation by us, are utterly 
opposed to the spirit and genius of our in- 
stitutions, and to our traditional and declared 



40 

policy for seventy-five yetiis, and should not be 
recognized by our government. But promises 
of protection from Spanish oppression or mis- 
rule, whether made to the insurgents in the field 
or to the limited number of the natives with 
whom our forces have come in contact, must 
be fulfilled. The fulfilling of these obligations 
does not entail annexation. They can be dis- 
charged, whatever nation may hold Manila, and 
be enforced by making it a condition of peace, 
especially if we retain a coaling and docking 
station on the islands. 

There is another imaginary dut}-, of tlie sen- 
timental order. It is said, when once the Stars 
and Stripes goes up there rises with the emblem 
of freedom our obligation to it and to ourselves 
never to strike or furl it. We are new to colo- 
nial wars and colonial conquests, and this is very 
new duty. Will its advocates kindly point out 
how many wars there have been in which more 
or less conquered territory was not surrendered 
at the close of the conflict, or traded for some 
other territory? There is hardly a war in his- 
tory in which the winning flag has not come 
down somewhere. And it is often clearly to 
the victor's interest that it should. 

If it is/rtiot for the best interests of tlie United 
States to stay at Manila, is she obliged to do so 
merely because her standards have been planted 



41 

there? We have recent]}' been aiiy^ised by the 
punctilios and quixotic notions of Spain and of 
certain Spaniards, and a keen sense of humor 
might serve to check the disphiy on our own 
[)art of sentiments that are quite as high-flown 
and fantastic. These sentiments might seem 
less absurd if we had not gone to ]\lanila solely 
to destroy the enemy's fleet and to obtain a base 
of supplies. It was a measure forced upon ns 
by the necessities of war and leaves us free on 
the return of peace to depart from Manila 
unhampered by any feeling of false or foolish 
pride. 

But it is urged there are duties to the seven 
or eight million Filipinos, beyond the suburbs 
of Manila, wlig, must not't)Yily be rescued from 
the Spanish 3'oke but Christiittiized and civilized 
as well. The vagueness and the vastness of 
the suggestion almdit benumb the faculties. 
In what species of crusade or knight-errantry 
have we embarked at the close of this nine- 
teenth century, and how far will it^onduct us? 
Untold millions of the African race are to day 
living under the sway of foreign powers with 



whom at some future time we may have the 
misfortune to be at^ war.^^ljA. few million ^^ 
4 hoeo Afrioano -*«rr/ru-red by Spaing if we 



were to send a fleet to Africa and seize a port or 
sink a ship or two, ^!!f)uld we sutp at that? 



42 

Would it fl«4 become a " duty " to assume at 
once the rule of protector or of pedagogue to 
countless million negroes scattered over count- 
less thousand square miles of swamp and 
jungle ? The majority of the Malay and mixed 
races of the Philippines are almost as barbarous 
as the Africans and more intractable. Many of 
these people have sliown no desire for relief 
from the Spaniards, and others do not lequire 
it, being practically independent. The majority 
of them would not understand our proffered 
kindness. Some of the islands are so wild, 
rough and inaccessible, and tiie inhabitants so 
uncivilized that it wau a^ ^voi estimated that 

A. 

50,000 of our bra ve sol diers would be none too 

many for co)iqHest. 4F^i(^o^[ma()L iiKj l»4,L 4i- naiood 

«tO'-----16 ?0 <) Q ^ ----t<s---ft&>ji4 l -ft d e^'i^mtev " relief 'I -^ 

.s tanding 'ariuy larger than , thio would be I'c 

quiro ' d -. A s^ / a elV - rc.j}fcctiifg' Americans many of 

us are taught that our highest duties lie nearest 

l4©4»€. Nutiono and individualt} -wno rush pre- 

-to ^ . 

sumptuous^ in and tcilio up distant, indefinite, 

self-assunied duties ^s a rul^^iire not angels.^ 

Moreover as a missionary field it is difficult to 

understand the attraction or the promise of the 

archipelago. Man}^ Protestant Churches and 

church papers seem, or did seem, to look upon 

it with proselytic eyes. But according to The 

Catholic World about 6,200,000 persons are 



43 



members of the Roman Catholic Communion, 
at least nominally, and we are already be- 
sought to quell not only civil but religious war. 
Foi^the insurgents have risen against church as 
well as against state and seek to expel large 
numbers of the friars. What will their many 
million co-religionists in this country say to that .'' 
And the Pope is already an^ vith digni t y m- 
tervening in behalf of the persecuted. It an- 
nexation is sought for the purpose of bringing 
the natives into the fold of Protestantism it will 
invite bitter religious strife at home and abroad, 
a strife foreign to our experience and utterly 
opposed to our policy, and from which every 
patriotic American should shrink. The Roman 
Catholic population of the Philippines accord- 
ing to The Catholic ^Yorld for August, 1898, 
quoting a French ecclesiastic authority is as 
follows : 



1892 



1895 



Augnstinians, • ■ • • 2,082,131 souls. 

Recollects, VoiO 43 " 

Franciscans, 'Lqq'q?! " 

Dominicans, „io'nfi^ " 

Jesuits Z\A,^ u^ 

Total,^ 6,148,250 " 



All these perplexities, these new and vast 
responsibilities, we avoid if we avoid annexa- 
tion. Humanity may demand that the island- 
ers do not remain under Spanish rule. But 



44 

neither humanity nor self-interest requires that 
they come under ours. So far as questions of 
duty and humanity are concerned the other 
powers, as was indicated in a previous chapter, 
are compelled to extend their sway over new 
regiorjs and over barbarous as well as half civi- 
lized races. With all the civilizing agencies at 
their command and their wide experience, it 
would be pharisaic to hold that we alone can 
restore prosperity and content among the Fili- 
pinos. 

Egypt's marvelous transformation and ad- 
vance within the last few years, is only one of 
the latest examples of England's genius for rul- 
ing alien races and developing their resources. 
Opi)Osite the Philippines, Cochin-China is ad- 
vancing and prosperous under the rule of 
France. Russia's great success in unifying 
Northern Asia is due to the skillful way she 
adapts her rule to new races, making them first 
content and then anxious to be Russianized. 
Wherever Germany's flag is raised, law and 
order are strictly enforced, and thrift and enter- 
prise encouraged. The Philippines lie directly 
in the path of these and other powers, and di- 
rectly within their sphere. Tlie exigencies of 
the Cuban war placed them in our pathway to 
victory, but they lie far outside our sphere. We 
should therefore seek all the commercial and 



45 



tinancial opportunities which the situation at 
Manila offers, but at the same time, respect the 
rights of other powers and welcome relief at 
their hands from the responsibilities which do 
not rightfully belong to us. 



CHAPTER VI 

The Opportunities at Manila 

AFTER a mighty and autocratic monarch 
has proposed disarmament, lessening of 
national strife, and advance toward ultimate 
peace, it would be a strange, portentous sight 
for tlie great and hitherto most peaceful repub- 
lic of the world to cross seven thousand miles 
of ocean and cast her gauntlet in" the face of 
the powers, proclaiming, " one law for us and an- 
other for you ; a Monroe Doctrine for America, 
but none for Asia." On the other hand the 
great republic can mightily help the cause of 
peace and of the Prince of Peace by recognizing 
lier clear responsibilities to other nations and 
treating them witli open candor and good faith. 
We cannot, dare not, abandon our Monroe 
Doctrine. Why then seek to compromise it? 
Why not rather safeguard it for the future by 
fully and freely recognizing its Old World 



46 

counterpart? Here lies our first and greatest 
opportunity at INIanila. And to seize such an 
opportunity will be extremely politic as well as 
righteous. To retire from the Old AVorld, or 
at least to offer to retire, on the ground that we 
claim no territory there, will vastl}^ strengtiieu 
and sanction our attitude in the New World. 
We may then pursue our career and fulfil our 
destiny in our own hemisphere without fear of 
check or hindrance from any quarter of the 
globe. 

Fortunately this path is still open. The pro- 
tocol is merely preliminary, the final terms of 
peace are entirely unsettled, — at least so far as 
the Philippines are concerned. It appears that 
we shall have plenty of time to think, plenty 
of time to revise our estimate of the value of 
the islands, and to appreciate the enormous ex- 
pense and responsibilities their possession will 
involve. So far as commercial and other op- 
portunities are concerned, we may find almost 
as effectual a way to improve them without an- 
nexation as with it, and in doing so we may en- 
large our field of operations far beyond the 
Philippine group. 

Little thought has been devoted to these 
considerations, public attention having Ijeen 
diverted in other directions largely owing to 
the persistent clamor in regard to the mainte- 



nance of our alleged rights, and to the dischargQ 
of our self-imposed duties at Manila. Suppose, 
however, that by the final treaty of peace, we 
are granted a coaling and naval station near 
Manila and one in the Ladroues; that we are 
also given a power to sell the islands to the 
highest bidder, or to several such bidders. Out 
of the proceeds of the sale we ought first to be 
paid all the expenses of the conquest and oc- 
cupation ; also, as a commission for effecting 
such sale, a sum of five or ten million dollars, 
sufficient to fortify our stations at Manila and 
vicinity, at Hawaii and Pago Pago, — and per- 
haps one on the coast of China, obtained with 
the consent of the powers in return for ceding 
our territorial claims on the islands. Any pur- 
chase money in excess of ten million and our 
military expenses might be paid to Spain for 
relinquishing her rights in the islands to their 
new rulers. 

If any such arrangement can be made it 
would be the second greatest opportunity of 
the situation. We should be in, rather than 
largely out of pocket. And, what is more, the 
trade of China is of infinitely greater value 
than the trade of the Philippines. The former 
is our real objective, commercially speaking. 
There can be little fear of opposition on the 
part of China. Our appearance at a port oij 



48 

the Yellow Sea would help maintain the integ- 
rity of the Chinese Empire, and be as wel- 
come to England as to China. And if that 
empire cannot be held together ver}' many 
years longer we should be in a position there 
to assert and guard a " sphere of commercial 
influence," and we would be as fully entitled 
to this as are any of the other powers. 

A moment's reflection will show that from a 
commercial stand])oint we have a personal in- 
terest in England's trade with the Orient that 
should cause us to view any injury to it with 
concern and apprehension. England is to-diiy 
by far the largest and best customer the Amer- 
ican market can boast. But her purchasing 
power will be greatly crippled if her rivals suc- 
ceed in appropriating her share of the trade of 
the East, which at the present time they seem 
bent on doing. In the Forum for August, 1898, 
Professor Brooks Adams has convincingly dem- 
onstrated that from the very dawn of history, 
trade with the Orient has given its possessors 
wealth and commercial leadership in the world. 
From every point of view then, China, far be- 
fore Manila, is our commercial goal. 

Important trading privileges, it is said, are to 
be had at the islands for the asking. Some 
liave been mentioned in the dispatches, and no 
doubt are under consideration. It has been 



49 



proposed that Ameiicaii goods enter Philippine 
ports duty free, or with protective tariffs on 
some lines of merchandise. Ail such conces- 
sions, however, could be made or ratified in 
treaties of sale to other nations. 

Of course it will be said that any plan to 
transfer the Philippines to European or Asiatic 
powers presents many difficulties. That may 
be granted without, conceding that the difficul- 
ties cannot be overcome. From recent disclos- 
ures it does not seem likely that Spain in her 
impoverished condition would be averse to be- 
ing relieved of her charge, a most turbulent 
and expensive one. The prospect of twenty, 
thirty, or forty millions surplus from a sale 
would probably be an added inducement. 

The second difficulty would proceed from the 
powers. It has been frequently urged that the ^ 
powers could never agree among themselves to 
a partition of the islands, and therefore they 
would prefer the islands to remain in Spanish 
or American hands. Almost all suggestions of 
this kind however, have proceeded from Eng- 
lish sources, and England's motives for wishing 
to keep us at Manila have already been given. 
Moreover, as we have also seen some of the 
other powers have taken quite a different line 
and have plainly hinted at the Monroe Doctrine 
of Asia, as they call it. To some of the pow- 



50 

ei's the islands present many politic and strate- 
gic, as well as commercial advantages. They 
have had so much practice abroad in adjusting 
their ''balance of power " and in granting to 
one nation "compensation" for the advantage 
secured by another that they have become ex- 
perts in such matters. 

And with so many islands to choose from, 
extending througli many degrees of latitude 
and of abounding resources, it ought not to 
be difficult to agree upon a fairly satisfactor}- 
division. Such agreement is clearlj' to the in- 
terest of, at least some of the powers, and 
where two of the parties to a bargain have a 
clear interest in making it, the bargain is pretty 
well assured so far as those two are concerned. 

There remains only the party of the third 
part, the United States of America. Of course 
the whole of this pamphlet aims to show that 
we have more to gain by the proposed arrange- 
ment than any of the other possible parties to it. 
The. reported attempt of one power to interfere 
with the operations at Manila, even if con- 
firmed, ought not to blind us to the rights of 
other powers or to our own true interests. In 
such a case and, if only for fear of being left 
out of future consideration or consultation, the 
offending power would surel}^ give redress. 
Besides, as has been fully urged, our right to 



51 



resent or repel interference with our military 
movements at Manila does not necessarily 
involve a right to resent^ ojuosition to the dis- 
posal of the islands, foyj ATn o ltlttci4 mtefteeT the 
rights of other powers are affected. 

There has been a studied effort to confuse 
the distinction and to maintain that any foreign 
objections would be as intolerable after as dur- 
ing the war. On the contrary, by persisting in 
such an attitude, the intolerance becomes ours. 
To assert that the near neighbors of the Philip- 
pines have no interest or voice in their future 
is both arrogant and untrue, and makes our 
Monroe Doctrine appear grossly and offensively 
unjust. Instead of being forced to recognize 
this we should be the first to do so, and should 
proceed to take the initiative by calling a con- 
ference, or at least by consulting the powers 
concerned. If they, for any reason, are unable 
to agree, or*» waive their interests, our position 
at home and abroad will tlien be unassailable. 
If we ignore their claims, we are likely to find 
ourselves confronted with a strong coalition in 
Asia^^te r, thi o mny l o ad 4e-a coalition against 
tt+Un America.Z^T ?<'?'" ^v7. 

We proclaimed this war to be one of human- 
ity and civilization. We cannot afford to close 
the campaign in a spirit of greed or wantonly 
to ignore the rights of other nations. The 



52 

Monroe Doctrine is worth five hundred Manilas. 
In the scales with the Monroe Doctrine lie our 
national honor and our national credit. Will 
the people of the United States exchange these 
for Manila ? 



IMMIGRATION FALLACIES 

The Only Recent Book on Immigration 



BY 



JOHN CHETWOOD 

Author of "Manila, or Monroe Doctrine?" 
PAPER. 147 PP- ^5 CENTS. 



" A most admirable presentation of a most important subject."— 
Rl. Rev. W. C. Donne, D.D.. LL. D.. Bishop of Albany. 

'• Ailmiiahlv written anil extremely well calculated lor its pur- 
pose. It slKn'ild be widely circulated."— jSi/dnej/ O. Fisher, Author 
of Evolution of United Slates Constitution, etc. 

■' Very interesting and valuable. A powerful contribution to on© 
of tlie most momentous questions affectiuf;; American civilization." 
—John J. Inqalls, ex Senator of the United States. 

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Conte. LL. D., So ", etc.. Professor in Geology in the University 
of California. 

"I wish every citizen of the United States might read your little 
book."— J^rnnAr Soule, Ph.D., etc.. Professor Civil Enciineering, 
University of California. 

"I read the book with great interest."— Jb/in G. Hihben, Ph.D., 
Professor of Logic in Princeton University . 

"Avery clear and convincing statement of the enornums evils 
resulting from immigration."— P«c(/ic Churchman, S. F. 

"A very excellent little book on a very important subject."- 
Buffalo Courier. 

"A very full and interesting discussion of the immigration prob- 
lem."— J///ineapo/<s Times. 

" Most ably written and forceful in argument."— P/u7a(ZeJp/u'a 
Item. 

"A clever and valuable little volume."— Totedo Blade. 

" The book merits a wide circulation and careful reading."— 
Chicago Interior. 



PUBLISHERS 

ROBERT LEWIS WEED COMPANY 

63 Fifth Avenue, New York 



LIMITATION OF WEALTH 



OR 



How to Secure Prosperity for All 



BV 

E. N. OLLY 



" 'Ih* doctrine of Limitation does not deny any of the essential rights of 
men ^'""'"''0' ^'"^' ""' 'he A'/,g-/i/ of property is at fault. It is the /^^i* 
iiiulIi and the loo littU that create the untold miseries in this world. 

•• Let no one own more than Ji,ooo,ooo of American properly." 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter I. — Concentration of Wealth in the United States 
"11. " " Income 

" 111. " " Savings 

" IV. " " Real Estate 

'< V. " " Securities 

" VI. — Army of the Unemployed 
" VII. — Trusts and Monopolies 

V 111. —Why Utopia Failed 
" IX. — Other Remedies that Failed 
« X. — Limitation the Only Remedy 



PAPER. PRICE 10 CENTS 



PUBLISHERS 

ROBERT LEWIS WEED COMPANY 

63 Fifth Avenue, New York 



